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question:请将“In contrast to what Nancy Fraser or Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri maintain, Foucault does not stop at the discovery of the ‘disciplines’ and thus at the ‘fordist [sic] mode of social regulation’,405 or can only discuss its crisis.406 With the concept of the ‘government’ his by now published Lectures at the Collège de France on the history of governmentality407 introduce a very much post- Fordist technology. Susanne Krasmann therefore assumes rightly that the ‘new regime of power, which Gilles Deleuze sketched in 1990 as the society of control ... was indeed analysed by Michel Foucault with a concept of power, which he detailed in particular in his lectures at the Collège de France: the concept of government’.408 In principle Foucault is interested in the development of the ‘population’. In Discipline and Punish he thus maps out a technology of power that can meet the challenges of the population explosion in the context of industrialisation, and which is directed towards strengthening the force of the individual body. In The Will to Knowledge a second technology of power is added, which is directed towards the ‘life’ of the population, now understood as a ‘species’. From this perspective it already becomes clear that an adaptation to such global phenomena as ‘a global mass that is affected by overall processes’ requires more complex organs for coordination and centralisation than he had previously envisioned for the disciplines in the limited framework of institutions. This means that the state becomes the focus.409 In his later concept of government he then addresses population from the perspective of conducting men™ For the first time his interest is not focused on the body alone, but also on the more comprehensive processes of subjection. At the same time Foucault turns to the state itself. This is inevitable, when ‘the management of a whole social body’, its ‘whole scale’,411 is to be analysed. He wonders whether governmentality can be understood as some kind of ‘general technology of power’ that represents the outside of the state apparatus.412 The state in contemporary societies is not simply one of the forms or spaces of the exercise of power, writes Foucault now, but all other forms of power relation refer to it. Of course not because they are derived from it, but because power relations have been progressively governmentalised, so that they have been elaborated under the auspices of state institutions.413 The readjustment of the technologies of power shows in particular in that Foucault now insists that he has always looked into the presence and effect of the state’s mechanisms. For what else is the organisation of madness, of clinical medicine or of the disciplines ultimately? - ‘The problem of bringing under state control, of “statification” (étatisation) is at the heart of the questions I have tried to address’.414 It can thus be noted that with the increasing ‘statification’ or ‘government- alisation of the stated5 with the technology of power that inscribes itself in the apparatuses of the state, governmentality expands its sphere of influence and thus overdetermines the others or has a preeminent position.416 This is the perspective from which various technologies of power will now be presented. 2.3.2.1 The Juridical Technology of Power (Law) The first technology of power leads Foucault to distance himself initially from the classic understanding of the state, namely that of sovereignty. This differentiation has led to myriad misunderstandings, not least in relation to law. In the following I will attempt to map out what Foucault was concerned with in those reflections. The classic meaning of sovereignty is tied to the territory: sovereignty over a territory^7 Therefore according to the juridical theory of the sovereign, which may well have been appropriate for the absolutist states, the relation of the prince to his principality remains fragile, for the bond between them is only one of violence, family heritage or treaty. There is no essential connection between the two and therefore the relationship is continually under threat from external as well as internal enemies. The target of this power is thus the territory including its inhabitants. The traditional problem of sovereignty consists in conquering new territories as well as holding on to conquered territory.418 Sovereignty and law are here always closely linked, because since the Middle Ages power in occidental societies has always articulated itself through law. This seems initially surprising, considering that for Enlightenment philosophy monarchic power is on the side of injustice and not that of justice, while the democratic juridification of political power is, in contrast, an achievement of modernity. According to Kant the transition to the democratic nation state is determined by the replacement of the territorial principle by that of the union of individuals. His writings were in particular directed against the practices of contemporary absolutist states, which treated the people inhabiting a territory as mere adjuncts of its ground. Democratic law was a new constitutive moment in the development of the nation state’s identity.419 Foucault on the other hand considered the law as a traditional and seemingly outdated form of the juridical monarchy, even if it could be democratised. He emphasised that one must not overlook the ‘fundamental historical trait of Western monarchies: they were constructed as systems of law, they expressed themselves through theories of law, and they made their mechanisms of power work in the form of law’.420 In doing so, the great institutions could implant themselves precisely because they succeeded in presenting themselves as agencies of regulation, arbitration and demarcation, that is, as an organising power of the diversity of prior competing feudal powers^1 The great forms of power could thus insert themselves as a principle of law, enforce their laws by acting through mechanisms of interdiction and sanction, and establish peace as the prohibition of feudal or private wars - which is to say, in the words of Max Weber: monopolise the legitimate use of physical force. Roman law was thus decisive for the reactivation of a juridical edifice at the height of the Middle Ages, as a technical and constitutive instrument for authoritarian, administrative and ultimately absolute monarchic power. Even though this juridical edifice escaped from royal control in later centuries and was ultimately turned against royal power, the limits of that power were always the issue at stake here.422 Royal power thus progressively reduced the complex interplay of feudal powers and formed something like the keystone of a system of justice, buttressed by a military system.423 Foucault can therefore easily be read as though he holds the view that this form of power no longer plays a role and has been replaced by productive technologies. For legal theory this implies, however - and important theorists such as Alan Hunt and Garry Wickham and also Nicos Poulantzas understand him in this way - that Foucault holds the view that not only sovereign power, but at the same time also law, disappear in modern society. This would of course be a contradictio in adiecto for a legal theory and under the current conditions of increasing juridification also downright counterintuitive. However, Foucault encouraged this interpretation through his writing style and his orientation towards criminal law. But ultimately this is a misunderstanding. For this, let us firstly again review Foucault’s in part apodictic propositions: What does he understand by juridical practices? ... the manner in which wrongs and responsibilities are settled between [people], the mode by which, in the history of the West, society conceived and defined the way [one] could be judged in terms of wrongs committed ^424 [That is] the system of the legal code with a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited ... This, then, is the legal or juridical mechanism ... the archaic form of the penal order, the system we are familiar with from the Middle Ages until the seventeenth or eighteenth century.425 If Pashukanis can be accused of having written a theory of civil law, one could accuse Foucault of having limited himself to criminal law. Criminal law is at once the most repressive legal terrain and also one that is monopolised by the state. The connection of sovereignty and the right to punish up to the death penalty is completely associated with the repressive character of power. This fixation on the penalising form of law is now combined with statements which amount to saying that the juridical is regressing in comparison with preseventeenth century societies and that the functioning of the norm is made possible at the cost of the juridical system of the law,426 or that ‘our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law that had already begun to recede into the past at a time when the French Revolution and the accompanying age of constitutions and codes seemed to destine it for a future that was at hand’.427 In this context the demand to free oneself from the ‘juridico-discursive’ understanding of power,428 or to abandon the juridical model of sovereignty,429 actually appears at first glance like a daring underestimation of the significance of law and the state’s monopoly of force in contemporary societies. And it is precisely this charge Poulantzas brought forward against Foucault430 Because institutionalised political power recurs less often to violence under regulated relations of domination than in pre-capitalist times, the illusion can arise that modern power is no longer grounded in physical violence.431 In particular Hunt and Wickham reproach Foucault for this attempt to sketch law as an essentially pre-modern phenomenon.432 His view could be summed up as the ‘expulsion of law from modernity’.433 Foucault’s inclination to marginalise law is in sharp contrast to the main tendency of twentieth-century thought, which accords law a central role in modern society. His concept therefore rather corresponds to a common simplified view, which equates all law with criminal law. Carol Smart, who similarly to Hunt and Wickham, but from a feminist per-spective, follows Foucault, argues in line with this:”翻译为中文
answer:与南希·弗雷泽或迈克尔·哈特和安东尼奥·内格里所坚持的相反,福柯并没有止步于“纪律”的发现,因此也没有止步于“福特主义[sic]社会调节模式”,或者只能讨论其危机。通过“政府”的概念,他现已出版的关于政府性历史的法国高等师范学院讲座引入了一种非常后福特主义的技术。因此,苏珊娜·克拉斯曼正确地假定,“吉尔·德勒兹在1990年勾勒出的控制社会……实际上是由米歇尔·福柯用他特别在法国高等师范学院的讲座中详细阐述的权力概念分析的:政府的概念”。 原则上,福柯对“人口”的发展感兴趣。因此,在《纪律与惩罚》中,他勾勒出了一种权力技术,可以应对工业化背景下的人口爆炸挑战,并且旨在加强个体身体的力量。在《意志至上》中,第二种权力技术被加入,它针对的是现在被理解为“物种”的人口的“生命”。从这个角度来看,很明显,适应诸如“受整体过程影响的全球大众”这样的全球现象,比他之前为纪律在有限的机构框架内设想的更复杂的协调和中央化器官。这意味着国家成为焦点。在他后来的政府概念中,他从指导人的视角来讨论人口。这是他第一次不仅关注身体,而且还关注更全面的臣服过程。 与此同时,福柯转向了国家本身。当需要分析“整个社会体的管理”及其“整体规模”时,这是不可避免的。他想知道政府性是否可以被理解为某种“普遍的权力技术”,它代表了国家机构的外部。在当代社会中,国家不仅仅是权力行使的形式或空间之一,福柯现在写道,而是所有其他形式的权力关系都指向它。当然不是因为它们源自于它,而是因为权力关系已经逐渐政府化,所以它们是在国家机构的主持下制定的。权力技术的调整尤其表现在福柯现在坚持他一直在审视国家机制的存在和效果。因为,疯狂的组织、临床医学或纪律的组织最终是什么?——“使之受到国家控制,"国家化"(étatisation)是我试图解决的问题的核心。” 因此可以注意到,随着“国家化”或“国家的政府化”以及将自身记录在国家机构中的权力技术的增加,政府性扩大了它的影响范围,从而对其他技术产生过度决定,或者具有突出的地位。这是将要呈现的各种权力技术的视角。 2.3.2.1 权力的法律技术(法律) 权力的第一种技术使福柯最初与关于国家的经典理解,即主权理解保持距离。这种区分导致了无数的误解,尤其是与法律有关的误解。接下来我将试图勾勒出福柯在这些反思中所关注的内容。 主权的经典含义与领土相关:对一个领土的主权。因此,根据主权的法律理论,这或许适用于绝对主义国家,亲王对其领土的关系仍然脆弱,因为它们之间的联系仅仅是暴力、家族遗产或条约。两者之间没有本质的联系,因此这种关系始终受到外部和内部敌人的威胁。这种权力的目标因此是领土及其居民。主权的传统问题在于征服新领土以及保持已征服领土。 主权和法律总是紧密联系的,因为自中世纪以来,西方社会的权力总是通过法律来表达自己。考虑到启蒙哲学认为君主权力站在不公正一边而不是公正一边,而与之相反,民主政治权力的法治化是现代性的成就,这一点起初看起来令人惊讶。根据康德,向民主国家的过渡是由个体联合原则取代领土原则决定的。他的著作特别针对当代绝对主义国家的做法,这些国家将居住在领土上的人民视为其土地的附属品。民主法律是民族国家身份发展的一个新的构成时刻。另一方面,福柯认为法律是法律君主制的传统且看似过时的形式,即使它可以被民主化。 他强调,人们不必忽视西方君主制的“基本历史特征:它们被构建为法律体系,通过法律理论表达自己,并以法律形式使其权力机制运作”。借此,大机构能够确切地植根,因为它们成功地呈现自己为调节、仲裁和划界的机构,即作为多样化的之前竞争的封建权力的组织力量。因此,大形式的权力能够将自己插入作为一项法律原则,通过禁止和制裁机制执行自己的法律,并建立和平作为禁止封建或私人战争——也就是说,用马克斯·韦伯的话说:垄断合法使用物理力量。因此,罗马法在中世纪鼎盛时期对于重新激活法律建筑作为专制、行政和最终绝对君主权力的技术和构成工具是决定性的。尽管这个法律建筑在后来的几个世纪中脱离了王权控制,并最终被用来对抗王权,但这里始终争论的是权力的界限。因此,王权逐渐减少了封建权力的复杂相互作用,并形成了类似正义体系的顶石,由军事体系支撑。 因此,福柯很容易被解读为认为这种形式的权力不再发挥作用并已被生产性技术所取代。然而,对于法律理论而言,这意味着——正如艾伦·亨特和加里·威克姆以及尼科斯·普兰查斯等重要理论家理解他的那样——福柯认为不仅主权权力,同时也有法律,在现代社会中消失。这当然对于法律理论来说是一种矛盾的说法,在当前法治化不断增加的条件下也完全违反直觉。 然而,福柯通过他的写作风格和对刑法的关注鼓励了这种解读。但最终,这是一个误解。为此,让我们首先再次审视福柯的部分断言:他是如何理解法律实践的? ...即人与人之间如何解决过错和责任,西方历史上社会如何构想和定义一个人可以根据其犯下的过错被审判的方式...即法律法典体系,有允许和禁止的二元划分...这就是法律或法律机制...刑事秩序的原始形式,我们从中世纪直到十七或十八世纪都熟悉的系统。 如果可以指责帕夏卡尼斯写了一部民法理论,那么人们可以指责福柯将自己限制在刑法范围内。刑法既是最具压迫性的法律领域,也是由国家垄断的领域。主权与处罚权直至死刑的联系完全与权力的压迫性质相关联。这种对刑法形式的固定现在与声称与十七世纪以前的社会相比,法律在退步,以及规范的功能是以牺牲法律法典体系为代价实现的声明相结合,或者说“我们的历史梯度使我们越来越远离一个已经开始衰落的法律王国,在法国大革命和随之而来的宪法和法典时代似乎注定它有一个即将到来的未来”。在这个背景下,要求从“法律-话语”的权力理解中解放出来,或者放弃主权的法律模型,实际上乍一看像是对当代社会中法律和国家武力垄断重要性的大胆低估。这正是普兰查斯对福柯提出的指控。 因为在规范化的统治关系下,制度化的政治权力比前资本主义时代更少地回归暴力,容易产生现代权力不再基于物理暴力的错觉。亨特和威克姆特别指责福柯试图将法律勾勒为一个本质上的前现代现象。他的观点可以被总结为“将法律从现代性中驱逐”。福柯边缘化法律的倾向与二十世纪主流思想的主要倾向形成了鲜明对比,后者赋予法律在现代社会中的中心地位。他的概念因此更符合一个普遍的简化观点,将所有法律都等同于刑法。 卡罗尔·斯马特,与亨特和威克姆相似,但从女性主义的视角跟随福柯,按照这一思路争论:
question:请将“In fact much of Foucault’s genealogy de-centres law as the prime historical agent or mode of control. Rather he focuses on newly emergent forms of regulation and surveillance and constructs for us a vision of the disciplinary society in which law’s place diminishes with the growth of more diverse forms of discipline ... The status of law in modern societies is therefore somewhat uncertain in Foucault’s account ... However, I am doubtful that law is simply being superseded, nor can we assume that it remains unchanged - a relic form pre-modern times.434 In this sceptical interpretation^5 as Victor Tadros entirely accurately observed^6 the potential of Foucault’s work for law in particular is, however, lost. The ‘fundamental misunderstanding’437 consists in equating the term ‘juridical’ and ‘law’. By ‘juridical’ Foucault rather means to describe ‘any form of power, which attempts to prevent a certain type of action through the threat of legal or social sanctions’^8 The law appears in this juridical model as the basic form power shows itself in.439 The individual becomes the subject of natural laws or initial forms of power. What Foucault seeks to distance himself from might better be described as a kind of ‘juridical idealism’, that identifies all power as emanating from sovereignty.440 In principle Foucault wanted to grasp with this a very similar problem to Gramsci, namely that the focus on technologies of power in the form of violence ignores a whole series of other forms of power which have long ago gained ground in the niches of the law. In short, power and domination in modern societies are not limited to the dualism of law and violence, and from this perspective a significant aspect of modern power relations is missed. The historical background against which monarchic juridical power developed has until the present day encouraged the idea that law is the preeminent form of power.441 In sum, Foucault’s critique of the juridical model of power is not concerned with playing down the significance of law in modernity, but with critiquing an exclusive or essential interpretation of power in terms of law: violence, interdiction, censoring, coercion^2 Hence: ‘We must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code’.443 Even in one of his last lectures in 1981-2, Foucault still insists that the increasing juridification of Western culture ‘has led us to take law, and the form of law, as the general principle of every rule in the realm of human practice’.444 And precisely this general principle is only a superficial appearance, only one part of the real power relations. On this point there is a parallel to Neumann’s ‘veiling function of the law’. But this in no way means that modern law has become irrelevant^5 Furthermore, he rejects a chronological sequence of power technologies, according to which for example law has been replaced by disciplines and biopolitics. Rather, sovereign power still continues to play a decisive role after the eighteenth century: ‘I would say that, on the contrary, the problem of sovereignty was never posed with greater force than at this time’. 446 However, this does not mean either that a sovereign orjuridical model of power is appropriate. The old modalities imply the new ones. The juridico-legal system does not lack a disciplinary side, even if it appears less important^7 Neither are the juridico- legal structures cancelled out by mechanisms of security, on the contrary^8 So, there is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do not replace disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced juridico- legal mechanisms. In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques themselves change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mech-anisms of security.449 A complex analytics of power thus has to assume a ‘system of correlation’ of techniques and mechanisms, wherein one of the techniques can be dominant as is the case with governmentality in the era of the modern nation state. 2.3.2.2 Disciplines Foucault’s attempt to expand the analytics of power begins - as it does in Marx - with a general attack on the liberal ideas of bourgeois democracy and formal legal equality. While those base themselves, ‘blissfully unaware’,450 upon the freedoms of the law, beneath the legal form a very different technology of power has already implanted itself as the complement of formal legal equal- ity:451 For a certain bourgeois liberalism to become possible at the level of insti-tutions, it was necessary to have, at the level of what I call ‘micro-powers’, a much stricter investment in bodies and behaviours. Discipline is the underside of democracy452 While in the theory of the contract the contractual practices of subjects are always already self-explanatory and appear practically natural, Foucault makes clear that they are on the contrary the product of individuals who have been subjected to habits, rules and orders beforehand.453 The introduction of an explicitly codified and formal egalitarian legal framework blinds one to the ‘dark side of this process’: The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines. And although in a formal way the representative regime makes it possible, directly or indir- ectly, with or without relays, for the will of all to form the fundamental authority of sovereignty, the disciplines provide, at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies. The real, corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, juridical liberties.454 The similarities to Marx’s metaphor of base and superstructure can hardly be overlooked. While Marx’s materialism targeted the materiality of social relations, Foucault focuses on the practices of power inasmuch as they are exercised upon bodies.455 Dressage methods leave traces on the body in the form of habitual behaviours; power targets everyday gestures and activities^6 The human body enters a machinery of power, which penetrates, segments and puts it back together. Thus, in the seventeenth and eighteenth century a political anatomy and mechanics of power emerged.457 This increases the economic usefulness of individuals and their bodily forces in order to make them compatible with the growth of the apparatus of production.458 Simultaneously it reverses the course of their energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.459 The disciplinary individual460 is fabricated through procedures which distribute individuals, fix them in space, classify them, train their bodies, code their continuous behaviour, and maintain them in perfect visibility, surrounding them with an apparatus of observation and registration. Thus, they constitute a body of accumulated knowledge about them.461 While this technology of power is totalising and creates a certain suspension of the law,462 it is nonetheless less visible, violent and costly in comparison to the repressive, juridical technology of power.463 Foucault initially calls the effect of the disciplines ‘normalisation’, but even-tually ‘normation’.464 Initially this term sets itself apart from the ‘normativity’ of the legal imperative, which expresses a normative expectation of individual behaviour. Normalisation and normation on the other hand are techniques. Normation divides through classification, dressage and permanent control the normal from the abnormal. It posits an optimal model and then tries to get people, gestures and micro-practices to actually, not only normatively, conform to this model. The normal is precisely that which can conform to this norm.465 At first Foucault ‘discovered’ the connection of discipline and law in the systemic correlations of the technologies of power. Here he still assumed that discipline was the dominant technology of power, so that discourses born of discipline are invading law and normalising procedures are increasingly ‘colonising’ its procedures.466 Law and justice integrate more and more into a continuum of regulating apparatuses (from health to administration) which align the individual according to the norm. ‘Continual and clamorous legislative activity’ was merely the form which made an essentially normalising power acceptable.467 Accordingly, the fitting conclusion is that ‘[Sovereignty and discipline ... are in fact the two things that constitute - in an absolute sense - the general mechanisms of power in our society’^8 And even when Foucault expands his technologies of power, the principle of this reasoning remains. When the technology of governmentality is asserted, it is now the turn of the disciplines to refuse to vanish: ‘... but nevertheless, discipline was never more important or more valorised than at the moment when it became important to manage a population’.469 That Foucault theorises disciplines and not government in the early 1970s as the dominant technology can certainly be read in line with Nancy Fraser’s interpretation as an expression of the Keynesian welfare state of the time. Foucault grasped its inner logic, like the owl of Minerva, precisely in its moment of crisis.470 He situates the origins of the disciplines in the eighteenth century, but in a genealogical reading of Foucault’s texts the clinic and the prison appear as early and still isolated proving grounds for regulatory practices that only develop into a universal phenomenon with the advent of Fordism471 Here they are the ‘micro-political’ counterpart of Fordist accumulation, the ‘capillary’ level of its regulatory method.472”翻译为中文
answer:事实上,福柯的谱系学大量地解中心化了法律作为历史上的主要行动者或控制方式。相反,他关注新兴的调节和监视形式,并为我们构建了一个纪律社会的愿景,在这个愿景中,随着更多样化的纪律形式的增长,法律的地位减弱了……因此,在福柯的叙述中,法律在现代社会的地位有些不确定……然而,我怀疑法律是否仅仅被取代,我们也不能假设它保持不变——一个来自前现代时期的遗存。 在这种持怀疑态度的解释中,正如维克多·塔德罗斯完全准确地观察到的,福柯的作品对法律的潜力却被忽视了。这种“根本性误解”在于将“法律性”和“法律”这两个词等同起来。福柯用“法律性”这个词是想描述“任何试图通过法律或社会制裁的威胁来阻止某种类型行动的权力形式”。法律在这个法律模型中出现为权力展示自身的基本形式。个体成为自然法律或权力的初级形式的主体。福柯试图摆脱的,可能更好地被描述为一种“法律理想主义”,它将所有权力都归因于主权。 原则上,福柯想要把握的是与葛兰西非常相似的问题,即,关注以暴力形式出现的权力技术忽视了法律的缝隙中早已获得立足点的一系列其他形式的权力。简而言之,在现代社会中的权力和统治不限于法律和暴力的二元论,从这个角度看,错过了现代权力关系的一个重要方面。国王法律权力的历史背景一直鼓励着这样的观点,即法律是权力的最重要形式。 总的来说,福柯对法律模型权力的批判并不是要贬低法律在现代性中的重要性,而是批评了一种将权力解释为仅与法律相关的排他性或本质化的解释:暴力、禁止、审查、强制。因此:“我们必须构建一种不再以法律为模型和代码的权力分析学”。即便在他最后的讲座中,1981-2年,福柯仍然坚持认为西方文化的日益法律化“使我们将法律及其形式视为人类实践领域中每一规则的一般原则”。而这个一般原则只是表面现象,只是真实权力关系的一部分。在这一点上,与诺伊曼的“法律的掩饰功能”有所并行。但这绝不意味着现代法律变得无关紧要。 此外,他反对权力技术的时间序列,据此例如法律已被纪律和生物政治取代。相反,主权权力在十八世纪之后仍然发挥着决定性作用:“恰恰相反,主权问题从未像在这个时期那样被强力提出过”。然而,这也不意味着适合使用一个主权或法律模型的权力。旧的方式蕴含了新的。法律-法制系统具有纪律一面,即使它显得不那么重要。安全机制也并没有取消法律-法制结构,恰恰相反。 因此,并不是一系列连续的元素,新出现的导致早期的消失。没有法律的时代、纪律的时代,然后是安全的时代。安全机制并没有取代纪律机制,纪律机制又取代了法律-法制机制。实际上,你有一系列复杂的体系,在这些体系中,当然,技术本身在变化,变得更完善或更复杂,但最重要的变化是主导特征,或更确切地说是法律-法制机制、纪律机制和安全机制之间的相关系统。 因此,复杂的权力分析必须假定技术和机制的“相关系统”,其中一种技术可以像现代民族国家时代的治理性那样占主导地位。
question:请将“2.3.2.2 Disciplines Foucault’s attempt to expand the analytics of power begins - as it does in Marx - with a general attack on the liberal ideas of bourgeois democracy and formal legal equality. While those base themselves, ‘blissfully unaware’,450 upon the freedoms of the law, beneath the legal form a very different technology of power has already implanted itself as the complement of formal legal equal ity:451 For a certain bourgeois liberalism to become possible at the level of insti-tutions, it was necessary to have, at the level of what I call ‘micro-powers’, a much stricter investment in bodies and behaviours. Discipline is the underside of democracy452 While in the theory of the contract the contractual practices of subjects are always already self-explanatory and appear practically natural, Foucault makes clear that they are on the contrary the product of individuals who have been subjected to habits, rules and orders beforehand.453 The introduction of an explicitly codified and formal egalitarian legal framework blinds one to the ‘dark side of this process’: The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines. And although in a formal way the representative regime makes it possible, directly or indir- ectly, with or without relays, for the will of all to form the fundamental authority of sovereignty, the disciplines provide, at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies. The real, corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, juridical liberties.454 The similarities to Marx’s metaphor of base and superstructure can hardly be overlooked. While Marx’s materialism targeted the materiality of social relations, Foucault focuses on the practices of power inasmuch as they are exercised upon bodies.455 Dressage methods leave traces on the body in the form of habitual behaviours; power targets everyday gestures and activities^6 The human body enters a machinery of power, which penetrates, segments and puts it back together. Thus, in the seventeenth and eighteenth century a political anatomy and mechanics of power emerged.457 This increases the economic usefulness of individuals and their bodily forces in order to make them compatible with the growth of the apparatus of production.458 Simultaneously it reverses the course of their energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.459 The disciplinary individual460 is fabricated through procedures which distribute individuals, fix them in space, classify them, train their bodies, code their continuous behaviour, and maintain them in perfect visibility, surrounding them with an apparatus of observation and registration. Thus, they constitute a body of accumulated knowledge about them.461 While this technology of power is totalising and creates a certain suspension of the law,462 it is nonetheless less visible, violent and costly in comparison to the repressive, juridical technology of power.463 Foucault initially calls the effect of the disciplines ‘normalisation’, but even-tually ‘normation’.464 Initially this term sets itself apart from the ‘normativity’ of the legal imperative, which expresses a normative expectation of individual behaviour. Normalisation and normation on the other hand are techniques. Normation divides through classification, dressage and permanent control the normal from the abnormal. It posits an optimal model and then tries to get people, gestures and micro-practices to actually, not only normatively, conform to this model. The normal is precisely that which can conform to this norm.465 At first Foucault ‘discovered’ the connection of discipline and law in the systemic correlations of the technologies of power. Here he still assumed that discipline was the dominant technology of power, so that discourses born of discipline are invading law and normalising procedures are increasingly ‘colonising’ its procedures.466 Law and justice integrate more and more into a continuum of regulating apparatuses (from health to administration) which align the individual according to the norm. ‘Continual and clamorous legislative activity’ was merely the form which made an essentially normalising power acceptable.467 Accordingly, the fitting conclusion is that ‘[Sovereignty and discipline ... are in fact the two things that constitute - in an absolute sense - the general mechanisms of power in our society’^8 And even when Foucault expands his technologies of power, the principle of this reasoning remains. When the technology of governmentality is asserted, it is now the turn of the disciplines to refuse to vanish: ‘... but nevertheless, discipline was never more important or more valorised than at the moment when it became important to manage a population’.469 That Foucault theorises disciplines and not government in the early 1970s as the dominant technology can certainly be read in line with Nancy Fraser’s interpretation as an expression of the Keynesian welfare state of the time. Foucault grasped its inner logic, like the owl of Minerva, precisely in its moment of crisis.470 He situates the origins of the disciplines in the eighteenth century, but in a genealogical reading of Foucault’s texts the clinic and the prison appear as early and still isolated proving grounds for regulatory practices that only develop into a universal phenomenon with the advent of Fordism471 Here they are the ‘micro-political’ counterpart of Fordist accumulation, the ‘capillary’ level of its regulatory method.472 One must, however, concur with Thomas Lemke in that Foucault recognised the limitation of his earlier analysis. Precisely in the crisis of the Fordist regulatory model one can note an increasing move away from the disciplinary approach, which appears now almost archaic to Foucault, in comparison to the new technologies.473 The subjects, as he says in 1978, have become more and more varied, diverse and independent. More and more people are not subject to disciplinary coercion. Therefore it is evident that in future one has to say goodbye to ‘today’s’ disciplinary society.474 When he identifies the ‘security dispositifs’, even so-called panopticism suddenly appears to him as ‘the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign: None of my subjects can escape and none of their actions is unknown to me’.475 In Discipline and Punish he still opposed the disciplines with their institutionalisation in the ‘carceral archipelago’ to the concept of sovereignty^6 Discipline thus shares a similar fate to law in the history of theory; it is colonised by other technologies in the system of correlations. Thus far this has not been taken into account in the ‘dominant view’ amongst legal theorists’ critiquing Foucault. 2.3.2.3 Biopolitical Security Technologies Although a clear-cut distinction between law and the disciplines was still possible, things become more complicated and contradictory with the ‘newer’ technologies of power. Foucault seems to permanently search for an ever more subtle form of power, and thus tends to continually decentre his old discoveries, going so far as to use formulations such as ‘We have looked at all this’.477 What is new now - biopower or government, security dispositifs or technologies of the self? The next round of readjustments starts with The Will to Knowledge. Here Fou-cault develops the concept of ‘biopower’. Initially he distinguishes this form of power in the usual way, delimiting it from the sovereign or juridical model of power, and in this regard he takes up the line of argument he set out in Discipline and Punish. The further development consists in the understanding of disciplines as only one of two moments of biopower. Biopower is on the whole distinct from sovereignty in that it no longer takes place as a means of deduction, a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth - processes ultimately based on the right to ‘take life’ - but by ‘working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimise, and organise the forces under it as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race’. What matters now is thus to ‘foster life’.478 In this respect the argument remains in keeping with the disciplines. But now they are only one of two poles of development^9 For while the disciplines were directed towards the individual body, the pole which Foucault alternately terms ‘biopolitics of the population’ or ‘regulation of the population’ centres on the species body.48° The regulating controls target procreation, birth- and mortality rates. Biopower as an ensemble of disciplines and population regulation introduces the human species and its fundamental biological traits since the end of the eighteenth century as an object of politics.481 The reason for this is that capitalist development at the time brought an increase in productivity and resources, which ended the basic threats of famine and devastating diseases in Western cities so that ‘death was ceasing to torment life so directly’. In the space thus created, technologies of power could emerge, which took the processes of life in hand and no longer dealt with legal subjects, but with living beings.482 In this respect one can speak for the Western world of a ‘biological threshold of modernity’.”翻译为中文
answer:2.3.2.2 纪律 福柯尝试扩展权力分析学的努力——正如马克思所做的——以对资产阶级民主和正式法律平等的自由观念的一般攻击开始。这些自由观念“毫不知情地”基于法律的自由,在法律形式之下,一种非常不同的权力技术已经作为正式法律平等的补充植入:“为了某种资产阶级自由主义在制度层面上成为可能,有必要在我所说的‘微权力’层面上对身体和行为进行更严格的投资。纪律是民主的底层。” 虽然在契约理论中,主体的契约实践总是自明的并看似自然,但福柯明确指出它们恰恰是事先受到习惯、规则和命令制约的个体的产物。明确规定的和形式上平等的法律框架的引入使人对这个过程的“黑暗面”视而不见:“保障原则上平等的权利体系的一般法律形式,是由这些微小的、日常的、身体机制支持的,由我们称之为纪律的、本质上非平等和不对称的微权力系统支持的。尽管从形式上看,代表政权使所有人的意志形成主权的根本权威成为可能,但纪律在基础上提供了力量和身体服从的保证。真实的、身体的纪律构成了形式上、法律自由的基础。” 马克思的基础和上层建筑的隐喻的相似之处几乎是显而易见的。马克思的唯物主义针对的是社会关系的物质性,而福柯则关注权力实践,尤其是它们对身体的施加。驯化方法在身体上留下习惯行为的痕迹;权力针对的是日常姿势和活动。人体进入权力机制,这种机制穿透、分割并重组它。因此,在十七和十八世纪,政治解剖学和权力机械学出现了。这增加了个体及其身体力量的经济效用,使其与生产装置的增长相兼容。同时,它反转了它们能量的流向,将其转化为严格的服从关系。 通过分配个体、将其固定在空间中、对其进行分类、训练其身体、编码其连续行为,并将其保持在完美的可见性中,环绕着观察和记录的装置,从而构成了关于他们的累积知识。尽管这种权力技术具有总体性并在某种程度上暂停了法律,但与压迫性的、法律性的权力技术相比,它却不那么可见、暴力和昂贵。 福柯最初称纪律的效果为“规范化”,但最终为“规范化”。最初这个术语与表达个体行为规范期望的法律命令的“规范性”区分开来。另一方面,规范化和规范化是技术。规范化通过分类、驯化和永久控制将正常者与异常者区分开。它提出了一个最优模型,然后试图让人们、姿势和微观实践实际上(而不仅仅是规范上)符合这个模型。正常的正是可以符合这个规范的。 福柯最初在权力技术的系统关联中“发现”了纪律和法律的联系。这里他仍然假设纪律是主导的权力技术,以至于纪律产生的话语侵入法律,规范化程序越来越多地“殖民”它的程序。法律和司法越来越多地融入一个调节装置的连续体(从卫生到行政),这些装置根据规范调整个体。“持续而响亮的立法活动”只是使一种本质上规范化的权力被接受的形式。 因此,恰当的结论是“[主权和纪律......实际上构成了——绝对意义上——我们社会中的一般权力机制。”即使当福柯扩展他的权力技术时,这种推理的原则仍然保持不变。当治理性技术被提出时,现在轮到纪律拒绝消失:“......但尽管如此,纪律从未像在管理人口变得重要的时刻那样重要或被重视。” 福柯在1970年代早期将纪律而非治理作为主导技术的理论化,当然可以与南希·弗雷泽的解释一致地阅读,作为当时凯恩斯主义福利国家的表达。福柯正是在其危机时刻准确地把握了其内在逻辑,就像智慧女神的猫头鹰。他将纪律的起源定位在十八世纪,但在对福柯文本的谱系学阅读中,诊所和监狱出现为早期且仍然孤立的监管实践试验场,这些实践只有在福特主义出现时才发展成为一种普遍现象。在这里,它们是福特主义积累的“微观政治”对应物,是其监管方法的“毛细血管”层面。 然而,必须同意托马斯·莱姆克的观点,即福柯认识到了他早期分析的局限性。正是在福特主义监管模型的危机中,可以注意到与看似对福柯而言已经过时的纪律方法相比,人们正日益远离纪律方法,转向新技术。他在1978年说,主体变得越来越多样化、多元化和独立。越来越多的人不受纪律约束。因此,很明显,在未来必须告别“今天的”纪律社会。当他识别出“安全装置”时,即使所谓的全景主义突然在他看来成了“最古老君主的最古老梦想:我的所有臣民都无法逃脱,他们的所有行动对我都是已知的”。在《纪律与惩罚》中,他仍然将纪律与其在“监狱群岛”中的制度化对立于主权概念。因此,纪律在理论史上与法律有着相似的命运;它被系统关联中的其他技术所殖民。到目前为止,法律理论家在批评福柯时尚未考虑到这一点。
question:请将“2.3.2.3 Biopolitical Security Technologies Although a clear-cut distinction between law and the disciplines was still possible, things become more complicated and contradictory with the ‘newer’ technologies of power. Foucault seems to permanently search for an ever more subtle form of power, and thus tends to continually decentre his old discoveries, going so far as to use formulations such as ‘We have looked at all this’.477 What is new now - biopower or government, security dispositifs or technologies of the self? The next round of readjustments starts with The Will to Knowledge. Here Fou-cault develops the concept of ‘biopower’. Initially he distinguishes this form of power in the usual way, delimiting it from the sovereign or juridical model of power, and in this regard he takes up the line of argument he set out in Discipline and Punish. The further development consists in the understanding of disciplines as only one of two moments of biopower. Biopower is on the whole distinct from sovereignty in that it no longer takes place as a means of deduction, a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth - processes ultimately based on the right to ‘take life’ - but by ‘working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimise, and organise the forces under it as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race’. What matters now is thus to ‘foster life’.478 In this respect the argument remains in keeping with the disciplines. But now they are only one of two poles of development^9 For while the disciplines were directed towards the individual body, the pole which Foucault alternately terms ‘biopolitics of the population’ or ‘regulation of the population’ centres on the species body.48° The regulating controls target procreation, birth- and mortality rates. Biopower as an ensemble of disciplines and population regulation introduces the human species and its fundamental biological traits since the end of the eighteenth century as an object of politics.481 The reason for this is that capitalist development at the time brought an increase in productivity and resources, which ended the basic threats of famine and devastating diseases in Western cities so that ‘death was ceasing to torment life so directly’. In the space thus created, technologies of power could emerge, which took the processes of life in hand and no longer dealt with legal subjects, but with living beings.482 In this respect one can speak for the Western world of a ‘biological threshold of modernity’. Foucault thus now combines the various elements of his analytics of power in the concept of biopower as a conflictual whole.483 In doing so he adds a new technology of power on the side of the law and the disciplines in the form of the biopolitical regulation of the population. ‘Biopower’ and ‘life’ are not conceived of substantively or biologically by Foucault.484 With Foucault’s nominalism no prior substance can be thought, no substratum beyond relational power. ‘Life’ corresponds rather to ‘the totality of automatised abilities, the totality of behaviour, in short, the individual as “external unity’”485 Contrary to Victor Tadros’s assumption486 biopolitics and the later concept of ‘governmentality’ do not describe the same phenomenon. While they have a common object of regulation, namely the population, biopolitics concentrates, as the term already shows, exclusively on the biological regulation of the population, while the control of behaviours which Foucault addresses with ‘governmentality’ has considerably wider effects.487 The perspective Foucault pursues 1975-6 aims firstly at the differentiation between the juridical power to kill and the bio-political power of managing life. Here he encounters the issue of the population, which in turn led him to governmentality and thus the state, which from this perspective forms a crucial bio-political entity of regulation. In the lecture of 17 March 1976, which he gives while working on the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault furthermore introduces the ‘security dispositifs’, which, however, no longer appear in the volume itself.488 Two years later, however, in the lectures of January 1978, they once again play such a central role that Foucault even asks if contemporary societies are developing into a domain of security, a society of security.489 He asks whether the ‘general economy of power’490 in the system of correlation leads to the domination of the technology of security, which is based on juridical and disciplinary mechanisms and transforms them.491 The technologies of security represent the least systematic moment in Foucault’s analytics of power, for they are on the one hand introduced as technologies, but on the other as instruments or also as dispositifs. Those twists also occur because of the shared intersection of geo- politics and governmentality. In contrast to the disciplines - not to mention law - this is about the regulation and not the disciplining of ‘life’.492 Security mechanisms are regulatory mechanisms which seek to control the mass effects of a given population, not by individual drilling, but by the protection of ‘the security of the whole from internal dangers’. A ‘technology of security’ is distinguished from a ‘technology of drilling’.493 Biopolitics is a regulating technology of power which operates through the mode of security. The security dispositif leaves well enough alone, while discipline does not leave the smallest matters alone. They are not prevented, but seen as inevitable processes to rely on. While juridical power considers order as a residual category of that which is not forbidden, the disciplinary dispositif continually codes the permitted and the forbidden, and what matters are less the things that have to be refrained from than those that are to be done. The security dispositif on the other hand attempts to set things in motion, to control within ‘elements of reality’.494 Exemplary for this is the technology of vaccination. Thus a statistical analysis, a calculation of costs and an average (average rate of theft, mortality, etc.) are established, in order to subsequently keep conditions within a corridor of‘normality’, in the sense of the average^5 The target of this is the population in the sense of living beings and not people as legal subjects^6 In his search for ever more subtle technologies, Foucault accordingly arrives at population policy, which works through biopolitical security mechanisms. 2.3.2.4 Government However, the more Foucault turns to the regulation of the population, the more he has to shift the subject of his work. Already at the end of his third lecture on governmentality a ‘far-reaching turning point’ occurs when, ‘in a sort of dramatic theoretical turn’, a shift towards governmentality takes place.497With this term a new area of research opens up; the genealogy of the modern state, ‘the entry of the question of the state into the field of analysis of micro-powers’.498 Foucault arrives by way of biopolitics at security mechanisms and with them at the population. He now sums up himself: ‘While I have been speaking about population a word has constantly recurred ... and this is the word “government” ’.4" At the start of the fourth lecture he then says that he only wanted ‘to make a bit of an inventory of this problem of government’.500 In fact, however, he does nothing else from this point on. A ‘bit of an inventory’ turns into a reconstruction of political economy from the perspective of government. Since engaging with the population, he appears to increasingly hold the view that there are predominately two ‘economies of power’: on the one hand the long since known sovereignty, which however he now defines as the exercise of power over the fine grain of individual behaviours^1 that is, sovereignty now refers to legal and disciplinary power; and on the other hand the ‘government of populations’.502 Thus Foucault’s shift already shows here, when he separates the two elements of brainpower and introduces two economies of power: one is sovereignty, which is directed towards individuals, and the other government, which targets the population. The terms ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’ hardly appear any longer, and biopolitics is even limited to a local technology which inscribes itself in medical institutions.503 Instead he speaks of ‘government’ and ‘governmentality’. A law cannot be imposed from above upon the population through ‘legalistic voluntarism’, but the population has to be managed according to its own quasi-natural laws by acting upon it through analysis and calculation.504 From now on the question is thus no longer the safety of a territory, but the security of the population. It is not acted upon through laws and minute drills, but one allows circulations to take place and controls them,505 that is, the economy is introduced into the political administration - this is the main activity that matters in governing. Economy in the original sense - the wise government of the house for the common welfare of the whole. What matters is therefore that the inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, are subject to attentive surveillance and control^6 It is not a state or a territory that is governed, but people, individuals and groups.'’’117 Population is above all else the ultimate end of government.508 ”翻译为中文
answer:2.3.2.3 生物政治安全技术 尽管法律与纪律之间仍可能存在明确区分,但随着“较新”的权力技术,事情变得更加复杂和矛盾。福柯似乎一直在寻找更加微妙的权力形式,因此倾向于不断地将他的旧发现去中心化,甚至使用“我们已经看了所有这些”的说法。现在的新内容是什么——生物权力或政治、安全装置还是自我技术? 调整的下一轮从《知识意志》开始。在这里,福柯发展了“生物权力”的概念。起初,他以通常的方式区分这种权力形式,将其与主权或法律模式的权力区分开来,并在这方面继续了《纪律与惩罚》中的论证线。进一步的发展在于将纪律理解为生物权力的两个时刻之一。总体上,生物权力不同于主权,它不再作为一种扣除手段、减法机制、占有财富份额的权利——这些过程最终基于“取走生命”的权利——而是通过“激发、增强、控制、监督、优化和组织其下的力量作为生命和生存、身体和种族的管理者”。因此,现在重要的是“培育生命”。 在这方面,论证与纪律保持一致。但现在它们只是发展的两极之一。因为纪律针对的是个体身体,而福柯交替称之为“人口的生物政治”或“人口的调控”的极点集中于物种身体。调控措施针对生育、出生率和死亡率。生物权力作为纪律和人口调控的总和,自十八世纪末起将人类物种及其基本生物特征引入政治的对象。这是因为当时的资本主义发展带来了生产力和资源的增长,结束了西方城市的基本饥荒和毁灭性疾病的威胁,使得“死亡不再直接折磨生命”。因此产生的空间让权力技术得以出现,这些技术掌握了生命的过程,并不再处理法律主体,而是处理生物。从这个意义上可以说,对于西方世界,这是现代性的“生物学阈值”。 福柯现在将他的权力分析学的各个元素以生物权力的概念结合起来,形成一个冲突的整体。在这过程中,他在法律和纪律旁边增加了一种新的权力技术,即人口的生物政治调控。福柯没有从实质上或生物学上理解“生物权力”和“生命”。借助福柯的名义论,不能设想先验的实质,也不能设想超越关系性权力的基础。 “生命”更多地对应于“自动化能力的总体、行为的总体,简而言之,作为‘外在统一体’的个体”。 与维克多·塔德罗斯的假设相反,生物政治和后来的“政府性”概念并不描述相同的现象。虽然它们有共同的调控对象,即人口,但生物政治专注于人口的生物调控,而福柯用“政府性”所讨论的行为控制具有更广泛的影响。福柯在1975-76年追求的视角首先是区分杀戮的法律权力和管理生命的生物政治权力。在这里,他遇到了人口问题,进而导致他对政府性以及从这个视角形成的关键生物政治调控实体——国家的研究。 在1976年3月17日的讲座中,福柯在撰写《性史》第一卷时引入了“安全装置”,但这些在卷中再未出现。然而,两年后,在1978年1月的讲座中,它们再次发挥了如此核心的作用,以至于福柯甚至问当代社会是否正在发展成为一个安全领域、一个安全社会。他问“权力的总体经济”在相关系统中是否导致安全技术的统治,这种技术基于法律和纪律机制并转化它们。安全技术是福柯权力分析学中最不系统的部分,因为它们一方面被引入为技术,另一方面作为工具或装置。这种转变也是因为地缘政治和政府性的共同交点。与纪律——更不用说法律——相比,这是关于“生命”的调控而不是纪律化。安全机制是调控机制,旨在控制给定人口的群体效应,不是通过个体训练,而是通过保护“整体免受内部危险”的安全。安全技术区别于训练技术。 生物政治是一种通过安全模式运作的调控权力技术。安全装置对小事不闻不问,而纪律不放过最小的事情。它们不被阻止,而是被视为不可避免的过程来依赖。虽然法律权力将秩序视为非禁止事物的剩余类别,但安全装置不断地编码允许和禁止的东西,重要的不是那些必须避免的事情,而是那些必须做的事情。相反,安全装置试图使事物运转,在“现实元素”中进行控制。例如,免疫技术就是一个典型例子。因此,建立了统计分析、成本计算和平均水平(平均盗窃率、死亡率等),以便随后将条件保持在“正常性”意义上的平均水平的走廊内。其目标是以生物存在而不是法律主体的意义上的人口。福柯在寻找更加微妙的技术时,因此达到了通过生物政治安全机制工作的人口政策。